Advanced Game Theory Course By Matthew O. Jackson

Course description
Immerse yourself in the captivating realm of game theory with this advanced course. Over the span of four weeks, you will delve into the intricate world of designing interactions between rational and irrational agents to achieve desirable social outcomes. The course covers three key topics: social choice theory, mechanism design, and auctions.
In the initial week, we explore the challenge of aggregating preferences, examining voting rules and the complexities of collective decision making. We delve into pivotal theoretical concepts, including Arrow's Theorem, which reveals the absence of a "perfect" voting system, alongside Gibbard-Satterthwaite and Muller-Satterthwaite Theorems. The subsequent week focuses on designing mechanisms that account for self-interested agents and strategic misreporting of preferences, introducing the comprehensive framework of "mechanism design" and its key theoretical outcomes.
As we progress into the third week, our attention shifts to designing mechanisms that optimize collective happiness across agents, with a special emphasis on the influential Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms. The course culminates in the fourth week, exploring the intriguing realm of allocating scarce resources among self-interested agents and providing an introduction to auction theory.
Enroll in this advanced game theory course and unlock the complexities of strategic interaction, equipping yourself with invaluable insights into designing interactions for optimal social outcomes.
The following are the assignments covered in this course:
- Week 1: Social Choice
- Week 2: Mechanism Design
- Week 3: Efficient Mechanism
- Week 4: Auctions
The number 1 reason people take this program
This was a wonderful and very mathematically intensive course, but completing all the quizzes gave a great sense of accomplishment and developed my understanding of game theory and its various facets.
Most heard feedback on this program
The course covers a lot of deep and interesting topics.
About the instructor

Reviews
0 (0)
Social Choice
Mechanism Design
Efficient Mechanism
Auctions
Go to the course